Building a Stronger Eastern Partnership: Towards an EaP 2.0 by Korosteleva, Elena et al.







Building a Stronger Eastern Partnership: 
Towards an EaP 2.0
Tom Casier, Elena A Korosteleva & Richard G Whitman 
2 Global Europe Centre Policy Paper
BUILDING A STRONGER
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP:
TOWARDS AN EAP 2.0
Executive summary
The 28-29 November 2013 Eastern Partnership summit provides an
opportunity to reflect on how to refresh the EU’s policy towards its Eastern
neighbours.
This Policy paper sets out a reform agenda for the EaP by offering a roadmap
to the building of a stronger policy. The paper briefly outlines the background
and development of the EaP, its current state-of-play and then discusses how
the partnership might be enhanced and legitimated.
• The paper argues that the EU needs to define a ‘next generation’ objective
for the EaP as it enters the implementation phase of the current set of
Association Agreements (AAs).
• Our proposal is that the EU should set a European Partnership Community
(EPC) status as a bilateral and multilateral goal for the EaP.
• The EU should define a clearer, and measureable, set of objectives for its
role in the resolution of the ‘frozen’ conflicts of the Eastern Partnership.
• Policy towards Belarus needs refreshing with the EU giving consideration to
alternatives to the current perceivable stalemate.
• Speeding up visa liberalisation in a differentiated way may generate
additional influence for the EU and would enhance its legitimacy among
citizens of the EaP countries considerably.
• Deepen and broaden civil society engagement. The EU needs to invest
even more in deep democracy, linkage and people-to-people contacts to
avoid any conception that democracy promotion is one-sidedly dependent
on the willingness of political elites to give in to pressure and to warrant that
the policy enjoys legitimacy among the citizens of the EaP countries.
• Create a place for Russia. This requires a vision for cooperation with Russia
that would allow for the approximation of emergent legal economic regimes
(DCFTA and ECU) and would sustain the effort of modernisation and reform
in the region. The effort is needed to connect Russia more strongly and
positively to the EaP and to counter a logic of competition and alternative
regionalism, which creates an unwelcome and divisive situation for the EaP
countries. This requires, deeper discussion on the compatibility between the
DCFTA and the ECU.
3OVERVIEW
The Eastern Partnership summit in autumn 2013 provides an opportunity to
reflect and refresh the EU’s policy towards its Eastern neighbours. With the
fifth anniversary of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) falling on May 2014 the
policy has been in operation for almost half a decade. It has developed a
sophisticated framework, within which the EU’s bilateral and multilateral
relations with its Eastern neighbours are conducted. However, its
achievements – especially in terms of policy implementation and public
legitimation – have been more modest than ground-breaking.1 It is now time
to critically assess the performance of the EaP, and to evaluate whether it
provides a suitable framework, especially in terms of its strategic vision and
implementation practices, for the conduct of an effective and credible policy
in the eastern region.
for the EU of  creating a road-map for development
and deepening of  relations. However, the significant
differences are that the EaP is not officially intended
to hold out the prospect of  EU accession as the final
destination,10 and that the EaP’s path-dependency is
significantly shaped by the parallel developments in
the Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), and the
neighbouring regions (Iran, and Turkey in particular).
In addition, contextual cultural differences, including
normative underpinnings, have had their imprint on
policy developments and dialogue.11
The countries of  the EaP are disparate in terms of
the size of  the stages of  their economic and political
transition.12 Each represents a different challenge for
the EU in realising the objectives of  the policy to the
rule of  law, good governance, respect for human
rights, respect for and protection of  minorities, and
the principles of  the market economy and
sustainable development. Further, four of  the six
countries covered by the EaP (Moldova, Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia) are parties to ‘frozen’
conflicts which have remained immune to diplomatic
resolution to-date and retain the latent potential to
develop into armed conflicts on the EU’s borders.
The EU’s Eastern neighbourhood is also an area in
which the Russian Federation has sought to
preserve and advance its interests and with which
the EU is engaged in a competition for political and
economic influence
1 Whitman, R and Wolff, S eds (2010) The European
Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation
and Impact, Palgrave: Macmillan; Korosteleva, E (2012) The
European Union and its Eastern Neighbours: towards a more
ambitious partnership? Routledge; Casier T (2012), The European
Neighborhood Policy: Living up to Regional Ambitions? In: F Bindi
(ed), The Foreign Policy of  the European Union. Assessing
Europe’s Role in the World. Washington, Brookings Press, 99-117.
2 Eastern Partnership (2008), Polish-Swedish Proposal, Brussels,
23 May
3 Council of  the European Union (2009), Joint Declaration of  the
Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 8435/09 (Presse 78),
Brussels, 7 May
4 Steven Blockmans and Bart Van Vooren. Revitalizing the
European ‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’: The case for
legally binding sectoral multilateralism European Foreign Affairs
Review (2012), Vol. 17, pp 577-604,
5 See Annex 1 for the full summary of  EU initiatives
6 European Commission , ‘EU Cooperation for Successful Eastern
Partnership’, DEVCO 2012, pp 3-4
7 Commission of  the European Communities (2008), Eastern
Partnership, COM (2008) 823 final, 3 December; Commission of
the European Communities (2008), Eastern Partnership, SEC
(2008) 2974/3, 3 December
8 European Commission, ‘EU cooperation for a successful Eastern
Partnership’ , DEVCO 2012
9 Delcour, L (2011) ‘The Institutional Functioning of  the Eastern
Partnership: an Early Assessment’. Eastern Partnership Review,
No1. Tallinn: Estonian Centre of  Eastern Partnership; Korosteleva,
E et al (2013), eds ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy in the
Eastern Region: the practices perspective’, East European
Politics, 29(3), Special Issue
10 Although some EU politicians insist on differentiating between
European neighbours (in the east) and neighbours of  Europe in
the South (Sikorski speech, 26 May 2008;
http://euobserver.com/foreign/26211), with a default prospect of
EU membership if  all requirements of  EU acquis (including
DCFTA) are met in due course.
This Policy paper sets out a reform agenda for the
EaP by offering a roadmap to the building of  a
stronger policy. The paper briefly outlines the
background and development of  the EaP, its current
state-of-play and then discusses how the
partnership might be enhanced and legitimated.
Eastern Partnership – origins and
development
The EaP’s origins are in a joint Polish-Swedish
initiative of  May 20082 to see the reinvigoration of  the
EU’s relationship with its neighbours in Eastern
Europe and the Southern Caucuses then covered by
the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
The proposition was to develop a more nuanced
regional policy which would be better tailored to the
particular needs of  the Eastern neighbours, thus
firmly placing them into the orbit of  EU interests and
influence. Formally launched at a dedicated Eastern
Partnership summit in March 2009,3 the EaP was
embedded within the wider ENP, with initially no new
institutions, or secretariat, or dedicated funding
streams set up to handle the new policy. It
envisaged a two-track approach, of  bi- and multi-
lateral engagements, targeting various policy areas
at different levels and with different stakeholders.
Bilaterally each of  the participants is offered the
prospect of  an Association Agreement (AA) with the
EU but with no formal commitment that these
agreements hold out any prospect of  future full
membership of  the Union. The AAs would provide
for closer political association with the EU, as well as
economic integration through the creation of
individual Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Agreements (DCFTA) with each partner country and
which, in turn, as was initially conceived, might be
joined together to form a Neighbourhood Economic
Community (NEC).4 ‘Mobility and Security Pacts’ are
also envisioned to ease cross-border movement and
as part of  a ‘phased approach’ via visa facilitation
negotiations with partners and ‘in the longer-term’
opening dialogues on visa-free travel with all the
partners. This is further complemented by specific
sector cooperation cutting across thematic
multilateral platforms and flagship initiatives to
provide the main arrangement for the multilateral
strand. Notably, work continues in the areas of
energy, transport, regional development,
environment, economic governance and trade,
social protection and partners’ participation in EU
programmes and agencies.5 These activities are
covered under the existing European
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) and the
Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), which in
their totality amount to €1.6 billion for 2011-13 for the
eastern neighbours. This is further supplemented by
new funding streams of  Comprehensive Institution
Building (CIB) and Pilot Regional Development
programmes (PRD), totalling to 234 mio Euros for
2011-13.6
The EaP’s multilateral framework was initially
institutionally light, with the bulk of  implementation
pursued bilaterally with the participating states.
It was built around four ‘thematic policy platforms’
on democracy, good governance and stability;
economic integration and convergence with EU
policies; energy security; and contacts between
people. Five flagship initiatives – of  border
management, SME, energy, Prevention,
Preparedness and Response to Man-made and
Natural Disasters in the ENPI East Region (PPRD),
and environmental governance – further
complemented the policy platforms, to enhance
issue-specific cooperation and further sector
integration.7
Five years on, the multilateral track has developed its
own momentum, to include purpose-built
infrastructure, new instruments (Civil Society facility,
European Endowment for Democracy etc.), and
multi-level agency targeting virtually all levels of
society.8 In particular, in all six EaP countries, Civil
Society Forum (CSF), national platforms, Business
Forum, CORLEAP, and EURONEST have been set
up to provide civil society organisations and other
stakeholders with a chance to engage in the
implementation of  the EaP at the country level.
Moreover, the CSF is now a regular and active
participant in most EaP meetings. The multilateral
track is now often regarded as a more incentivising
way forward in terms of  the policy impact and
ownership,9 and is intended to provide a forum for
the exchange of  best practice between the six
partner countries.
Initially, the arrangements proposed for the EaP by
the Commission have faint echoes of  the
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the
Western Balkans and with the same intended benefit
www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec
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While the EaP’s institutional arrangements and policy instruments are
becoming increasingly complex and outreaching, the actual practices of policy
implementation and embedment into new social structures remain
circumscribed. 13 Furthermore, there seems to be a growing disconnect between
‘the more for more approach’ currently propagated by the Commission, and the
neighbours’ less than a lukewarm response to this complex matrix of
opportunities.
cooperation and self-censorship. It envisages more
decentring and local ownership, as well as targets
virtually all levels of  society – from civil society
agents, to business interest, local authorities and
national parliaments. The multilateral track is being
prioritised enabling partners to develop and share
best practices and to lobby their interests
collectively.
More specifically, the EU’s ambitions for the
upcoming EaP summit in Vilnius were set out clearly
by the EU in May 2012.15 The broad objective is to
see the advance of  the established policy
framework rather than to use the summit to set a
substantive new agenda and so will build on the
objectives set out in the previous Prague and
Warsaw EaP summit Declarations. As a backdrop to
the preparations for the summit there have been two
substantive policy developments: the Eastern
Partnership Integration and Cooperation (EaPIC)
programme and the European Endowment for
Democracy (EED).
The EaPIC programme was launched in June 2012
to make additional resources available to countries
that show progress in building deep and sustainable
democracy and in implementing related reform
objectives under the ‘more for more’ principle.16 The
EaPIC programme provides additional funding of
€130 million for the period 2012–13 on top of  the
€1.9 billion already committed to the EaP countries
for the period 2010–13. A first round of  country
allocations was announced to benefit Moldova (€28
million), Georgia (€22 million), and Armenia (€15
million). EaPIC contributes to new or existing
projects targeting democratic transformation and
institution building, sustainable and inclusive growth,
and economic development.
The EED became fully operational in 2013 on the
basis of  €15 million of  funding (of  which €6 million
is contributed by the European Commission and the
remaining from the Member States) and intended to
function as an independent European non-profit
foundation, with the participation of  representatives
of  Member States, the European Parliament, the
European Commission, the High Representative and
civil society organisations.
As indicated above, the substantive component of
the EaP is the bilateral strand of  policy for which
there is a different state-of-play for each country.
Further it is possible to order the countries on the
basis of  the degree to which they have deepened
their bilateral relationship with the EU:
Ukraine
Negotiations on the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement were finalised and it was initialled in
March 2012. However the AA was stymied by the
requirement of  Ukraine to comply with the
conditions set out in the Foreign Affairs Council
Conclusions of  10 December 2012.17 The EU was
seeking changes in Ukraine’s in three areas: the
compliance of  the 2012 parliamentary elections’
with international standards and follow-up actions;
Ukraine’s progress in addressing the issue of
selective justice and preventing its recurrence; and
in implementing the reforms defined in the jointly
agreed Association Agenda.
The EU’s position on the 28th October parliamentary
elections was that they were flawed and that
standards had deteriorated from those of  previous
elections. It was subsequently made clear that
shortcomings identified in the final report by the
OSCE-ODIHR needed to be fully addressed by
implementing its recommendations and dealing with
the observed shortcomings.18
The EU’s concern with selective justice and
politically motivated convictions of  members of  the
former Government concerned most especially the
treatment of  Yulia Tymoshenko after trials which the
EU viewed as not respecting international standards
regarding fair, transparent and independent legal
process and preventing opposition leaders from
standing in the parliamentary elections. Concerns
about Tymoshenko’s health resulted in the European
Parliament sending medical experts to assess her
health and treatment in May 2012.
EU-Ukraine relations continued to be complicated
by the Ukraine’s relationship with Russia, and
President Putin’s return to the Russian Presidency in
March 2012, on the back of  flawed elections to the
Duma in December 2011. Arguably, Russia’s
diplomatic pressure upon Ukraine to join the ECU
can be viewed as an attempt to frustrate the EU’s
effort to deepen its relationship with Ukraine.19
On implementing reforms defined in the jointly
agreed Association Agenda, the EU has added a
further set of  conditions for Ukraine on electoral,
judicial and constitutional reforms in line with
international standards. Further, Ukraine needs to
prepare for establishing a DCFTA by making
sustained efforts in the fight against corruption and
In contrast to the recent instability in the EU’s
Southern neighbourhood, the East is largely in a
condition of  on-going political atrophy. There has
been a changeable progress of  convergence with
the EU’s policies throughout the region. While
Belarus remained the unwavering constant in the
neighbourhood impervious to EU attempts to
encourage reform, the progress with the other
partners too has been far from linear. While Armenia,
Georgia and Moldova exhibit more positive than
negative political change, Ukraine in contrast has
been further backtracking from political reform
continuing to present considerable challenges for
the EU.14 Relations with countries in the South
Caucasus remained hostage to political instability
and the unresolved frozen conflicts of  South
Ossetia/Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Recent
developments in Azerbaijan were particularly
worrying regarding continuing violations of  freedom
of expression and assembly, with NGOs reporting
increasing levels of  harassment of  political
opponents, activists and journalist in the country.
The most dramatic recent political developments in
the Eastern Neighbourhood refer to the defeat in
Parliamentary elections in October 2012 of
President Mikheil Saakashvili’s ruling United National
Movement by the billionaire businessman Bidzina
Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream Movement; the
collapse of  the pro-European coalition in Moldova in
March 2013 and the threat of  the Communist return;
Ukraine’s signing the memorandum to deepen
cooperation with the Eurasian Customs’ Union on 31
May 2013; and the declaration by the Armenian
president on 3 September 2013 that his country
intends to join the Eurasian Customs Union.
EU policies
The EaP unarguably has come a long way in its
development to offer a complex framework of
institutionalised agency, instruments and
opportunities to enable partners’ voluntary co-option
into the EU modus operandi. The year 2011 in
particular served as a watershed for revisiting EU
strategies in the neighbourhood. The new approach
is now translated into roadmaps for individual
partner-countries to offer tailored objectives and a
complex matrix of  opportunities aiming to lock
participants into a ‘more for more’ modality of
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5Georgia was invited to enter into negotiations on a
framework participation agreement to govern its
participation in CSDP missions and operations. At a
more general political level, relations with Georgia
are complicated by the war with Russia in 2008 and
the unsettled issue of  Abkhazia and South-Ossetia.
The elections of  2012 resulted in a new government,
under Prime Minister Ivanishvili. He is regarded as
following a pragmatic line, seeking the normalisation
of  relations with Moscow.
Armenia
By the end of 2012, three rounds of negotiations with
Armenia on a DCFTA had been held and good
progress was made. This progress means the EU was
on track to meet the Roadmap objective of DCFTA
negotiations with Armenia, alongside Georgia and
Moldova, with possible finalisation by the Vilnius
summit. The EU and Armenia also signed a Visa
Facilitation Agreement at the Cooperation Council
meeting on 17 December. In October, the Armenian
Government signed a decree abolishing visa
requirements for EU citizens by January 2013. Depsite
these achievements, prospects for an AA, DCFTA and
closer relations with the EU in general seem to be
shattered by the announcement by President
Sargsyan on 3 September 2013 that Armenia intends
to join the Eurasian Customs Union. This step is widely
seen as the result of pressure by Russia, which is the
main security guarantor of Armenia.
Azerbaijan
The country made considerable progress in the
implementation of  the Action Plan in 2012. Positive
developments included the release of  the 2011
political prisoners, major economic reforms
introducing clearer rules on competition, budget
transparency, and sustained action against
corruption, and signing joint agreements under the
Strategic Partnership on energy between the EU
and Azerbaijan. The AA negotiations gained new
momentum preparing grounds for talks on DCFTA
and the WTO accession. Negotiations on Visa
Facilitation and Readmission Agreements were
successfully launched too. At the same time, issues
related to electoral legislation and democratic
reforms – especially in terms of  their implementation
– remain of  priority. Furthermore, there has been no
progress over settling the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, since the Sochi summit in 2012, and
confidence-building measure and judicial reform,
although having formally entered the second phase,
saw limited advancement beyond declarations.
public finance management reform, to improve the
deteriorating business and investment climate, and
stressing the importance of  inclusive reforms
through constructive engagement between
Government, parliamentary opposition and civil
society. The Council made the signing of  the already
initialled AA dependent on the determined action
and tangible progress in the three areas mentioned
above by the time of  the Eastern Partnership
Summit in Vilnius in November 2013. Over the last
months Ukraine has stepped up efforts to pass new
legislation to meet several of  the EU’s conditions.
There is a rather broad domestic consensus to sign
the AA, but at this point no firm commitments have
been made to release Yulia Tymoshenko.
Moldova
Moldova has been the EU’s best performing partner
in recent years. The indirect election of  Nicolae
Timofti as President in March 2012 ended a political
crisis which had persisted since April 2009. The
August 2012 visit by Angela Merkel, the German
chancellor and the first visit by José Manuel Barroso
to Chisinau in November 2012 highlighted the EU’s
desire to mark Moldova’s progress. This was on the
back of  a speech by Commissioner Füle in October
2012 seeing EU accession as a proposition for
Moldova. The country rated top of  the indices of  The
Eastern Partnership Index for the most EU integrated
states of  the EaP produced by the International
Renaissance Foundation.20 Recent political changes
in the configuration of  pro-European forces in
parliament and the increasing pressure by Russia
however may have some implications for the
country’s pace of  reform. Moldova continues to make
progress in the AA negotiations on chapters covering
economic and sectoral cooperation and five
chapters on the people-to-people contacts closed.
Negotiations on other chapters are either
provisionally closed or are very well advanced. The
ambition is to initial the AA at the Vilnius summit.
Negotiations on a DCFTA were anticipated to start in
early 2013. Moldova made substantial progress on
the implementation of  the Visa Liberalisation Action
Plan (VLAP) and the first phase benchmarks were
met, in line with the Roadmap. This required Moldova
to adopt several important legislative acts reforming
the judiciary and fighting discrimination. In
December, Moldova also signed a framework
participation agreement enabling its participation in
CSDP missions and operations.
Georgia
The EU’s negotiations with Georgia for an AA
proceed and negotiations are on track to meet the
EU-Georgia Roadmap objective on the DCFTA by
the autumn of  2013 at the Vilnius summit, at which it
is hoped the AA will be initialled. In November 2012,
www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec
11 Korosteleva 2012
12 The countries covered by the EaP are Ukraine, Moldova,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus.
13 Korosteleva et al (2013) ‘The ENP in the eastern region: the
practices perspective’, East European Politics, special issue,
29(3), September
14 Casier, T (2011) ‘The EU’s two-track approach to democracy
promotion: the case of  Ukraine’, Democratization, 18(4): 956-77.
15 European Commission & HR/VP (2012a), Joint Communication
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions, Eastern
Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 Summit, {SWD(2012)
108 final}{SWD(2012) 109 final} Brussels, 15.5.2012 JOIN(2012)
13 final http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/e_
pship_roadmap_en.pdf [last accessed 14 May 2013].
European Commission & HR/VP (2012b), Joint Staff  Working
Document, Eastern Partnership Roadmap 2012-13: the bilateral
dimension Brussels, 15.5.2012
SWD(2012) 109 final http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_
enp_pack/e_pship_bilateral_en.pdf  [last accessed 14 May 2013].
European Commission & HR/VP (2012c), Joint Staff  Working
Document, Eastern Partnership Roadmap 2012-13: the
multilateral dimension Brussels, 15.5.2012
SWD(2012) 108 final http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/
2012_enp_pack/e_pship_multilateral_en.pdf  [last accessed
14 May 2013]
16 European Commission (2012) Commission Implementing
Decision of  26.6.2012 on the Eastern Partnership Integration and
Cooperation programme 2012-2013 in favour of  the Eastern
Neighbourhood to be financed under Article 19 08 01 03 of  the
general budget of  the European Union
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2012/aap-
spe_2012_enpi-e_en.pdf  [last accessed 14 May 2013].
17 (Council of  the European Union, 2012a) and raised in the 2012
ENP Progress Report (European Commission 2013)
18 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2012),
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Election Observation Mission Final Report.
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6Following the launch of the ‘European dialogue on
modernisation’ with Belarus on 29 March 13, the EU
continues to make an effort to improve relations with
the country. The European Parliament recently
developed further draft recommendations
(PR_INI_art97) on EU policy towards Belarus, where it
was suggested (i) to use the Vilnius Summit as a
unique opportunity to restart the dialogue with the
country; (ii) to consider suspension of key officials
from the EU visa ban; and (iii) to develop strategic
‘roadmap’ for the country that could lead to a re-
launch of negotiations on a new comprehensive
agreement.24 Recent comparative opinion polls
observe some positive changes in public perceptions
of the EU and more critical attitudes towards Belarus-
Russia relations, which no longer appear to be a
default preference in the post-Soviet space.25
As can be indicated by these brief  reviews of  the
state-of-play in the EU’s relationships with its Eastern
neighbours these are largely shaped by the lack of
political commitment and reform within the partner
countries. Despite the introduction of  more
sophisticated machinery of  instruments/agents the
EaP is making modest gains in advancing
relationships with the bulk of  the EU’s Eastern
neighbours, and relationships remain vulnerable to
the vicissitudes of  political events on the ground as
demonstrated in relations with Ukraine, and subject
to normative and contextual differences between the
EU and the partners.
Belarus
The EU’s relationship with Belarus remained difficult
in the absence of  substantive political change in the
country. Belarus sits outside the bilateral track of  the
EaP, although some engagement continues along
the sector cooperation and visa/readmission issues.
The relationship with Belarus has most recently been
marked by the ‘teddy bear affair’ and EU’s response
to parliamentary elections. In early August there was
the expulsion of  Swedish diplomats, including the
ambassador, and the subsequent expulsion of
Belarusian counterparts from Stockholm. The dispute
came after a Swedish advertising agency, Studio
Total, air-dropped teddy bears in Belarus in July with
parachutes and placards calling for free speech. The
EU Member States kept their ambassadors in Minsk
as they were keen to retain diplomatic representation
on the ground to monitor the September
parliamentary elections. The ambassador expulsion
was a rerun of  events in February 2012 when the EU
and the Polish ambassadors to Minsk were expelled
because the EU imposed sanctions on an oligarch
friend of  Lukashenko.
The 2012 Parliamentary elections in Belarus, which
resulted in no opposition members entering
parliament, drew EU condemnation. Catherine
Ashton and Štefan Füle’s joint statement pointed that
the election was ‘another missed opportunity’.21
Martin Schulz, the president of  the European
Parliament, described the vote as ‘a mockery of  a
democratic ballot’, and urged the EU to ‘finally
devise an effective strategy [of] how to deal with
Belarus’ that would support civil society while
sanctioning the country’s leaders.22 Sanctions
against members of  the Lukashenko regime were
renewed by EU foreign ministers in October banning
Belarusian officials from the EU and their assets
frozen, although their nature and scope had become
more focused and specific.23 In particular, 29
companies belonging to three businessmen linked
to the regime are subject to sanctions. At the time of
writing (September 2013), diplomats in Brussels say
that there is no doubt that sanctions will be renewed
before they expire on 31 October.
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Is there more that can be done beyond the existing policy framework to further
advance the EU’s interests, make the EaP more effective, and to set the agenda
for the second half of the EaP’s first decade?
Institutional
Supporting specific civil society groups is laudable
and offers the enormous advantage for the EU that it
can circumvent the elites and support democracy
building from below. The EED complements the EU’s
conventional emphasis on leverage to promote
democracy, putting pressure on the political elites
rather than stimulating grassroots initiatives. The
challenge, however, is how to select the
organisations which deserve support without
running the risk of  being seen as selective and
interfering into domestic affairs.
The newly launched EaPIC is yet to offer substantive
benefits in the pursuit of  its objectives. Its focus
should be on enhancing the legal dimension of
integration, through approximation of  shared
practices and norms in sector cooperation in
particular. The post-Vilnius agenda is becoming a
pressing issue having to consider specific
roadmaps’ objectives and partners’ motivation and
capacity to offer tangible deliverables. Furthermore,
the ultimate purpose of  the DCFTA is increasingly
questioned by the partner countries, especially by
business communities. The future model of
economic integration (such as an EFTA; or EEA
model) remains ambiguous potentially undermining
the effort and commitment to reform.
The Euronest Parliamentary Assembly renewed its
functioning in 2011. The 28-29 May 2013 meeting
issued resolutions concerning measures to enhance
regional and energy security policies, combating
poverty and approximation with the EU economic
acquis. The challenge of  renewing dialogue with
members of  the Belarusian parliamentary assembly
impends, following recent recommendations by the
European Parliament (PR_INI_art97).
National Platforms have now established to offer a
forum for exchange of  ideas and best practices
across the region and increased dialogue with the
EU. At the same time, they often remain fragmented
and poorly coordinated, and require further internal
institutionalisation with extended roles of  agenda-
setting and monitoring; development of  respective
infrastructure and closer integration into EU
decision-making structures.
There are a set of  structural constraints that
currently hinder the full optimalisation of  the
opportunities offered by the EaP. These can be
divided between internal and external challenges.
Internal challenges
The internal challenges faced by the EaP can be
divided into three main types: bilateral, political and
institutional.
Bilateral
The main challenge is to solve the catch-22 situation
with Ukraine. Both Brussels and Kyiv seem very
keen on signing the AA, to avoid any further
politicisation of  the issue, and to provide continuum
to the policy dialogue in the region. Notably, the EU
needs the agreement, because it would be the first
major achievement of  a decade of  ENP and would
be a major step to legally tying Ukraine closely to the
EU. Ukraine, under pressure of  its oligarchs, needs
the agreement for the economic and commercial
opportunities it creates to ensure Ukraine’s growth
and stability. The stalemate over the Tymoshenko
case forms a major obstacle to the much desired
Association Agreement. It has obtained a central
symbolic significance with both Brussels and Kyiv
risking to lose face when making serious
concessions. Tymoshenko’s call on the EU to go
ahead with the AA may have created some room for
manoeuvring, but the credibility of  the EU’s
normative agenda is at stake. Presently, the EU
discourse on the matter is ambiguous and non-
committal leaving responsibility and initiative for
‘signing in’ with partners. More advocacy and
proactive legitimation are thus necessary to ensure
the legal commitment on both sides.
Although signing/initialling the AAs/DCFTAs is a
commendable objective to ensure a legal framework
for cooperation, multitudinous uncertainties are still
in place. They reflect both the lack of  strategy for the
post-Vilnius agenda (from ensuring implementation
to extending agreements to the frozen conflicts, from
VLAP resistance to the questionable fungiability of
the DCFTAs), and more essentially, the lack of  future
vision – what comes after the DCFTA to justify
compliance? – being further obscured by evolving
and ever-expanding policy processes and
procedures.
The key challenge for implementing the agreements
is that the necessary mechanisms to control and
guarantee implementation of  the AAs are
insufficiently developed. The major obstacles to
effective implementation on the ground (such as
corruption and the lack of  an independent judiciary)
need to gain more attention. Further the EU needs to
do more to win the hearts and minds of  people and
to get active support from citizens and local NGOs
(which is essential to give the policy the necessary
legitimacy, but will also reinforce implementation).
Political
Another set of  challenges is related to internal
political dividedness within the EU, which is both
visible on the EaP matters and in dividing lines
between those favouring a Russia-first policy in
certain areas versus those preferring an EaP-first
policy. Though the disagreement among member
states is often overrated, the EaP would definitely
benefit from a stronger internal coherence.
Indicative of  an internal political divide between the
member states and other institutional actors is the
current division of  labour between the EEAS and the
Commission in this policy domain.26 Whether the
appropriate settlement was reached in the
respective roles for policy definition and
implementation in the implementation of  the
provisions of  the Lisbon Treaty remains an active
topic of  debate. The current HR/VP and
Commissioner Füle have worked effectively in
tandem on the ENP and EaP. This is no guarantee
that their successors appointed in 2014 will develop
such a good working relationship and a turf  war for
control over the neighbourhood policy is one
possibility.
www.kent.ac.uk/politics/gec
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Westminster, HL paper 147, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldselect/
ldeucom/147/14702.htm
8Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) by 2015 and the
Eurasian political union in the future. The challenges
are manifold. Not only do they currently reflect the
lack of  consensus on the EU-Russia relations
amongst the EU Member States and EU key
institutions. They also lack strategy as to how the
existing incompatibility between the DCFTAs and the
ECU code of  practice could be reconciled to ensure
benefits for all parties concerned. It is therefore
important to rethink how the EaP can be further
developed and in the longer term even be integrated
into the parallel developments in the region, without
further alienating Russia. This is crucial, for Russia
remains a major player in the region, also
economically. Moreover, it is inevitable if  the EaP is
to contribute to the creation of  stability on the EU’s
eastern borders. In other words, the EaP stands a
better chance of  yielding fruits if  it does not go
against but seeks cooperation with Russia.
External challenges
The main external challenge is Russia. From the
onset, Russia perceived the EaP as an anti-Russian
move. Foreign Affairs Minister Lavrov called it a clear
attempt to establish ‘a sphere of  influence’ in an
area where Russia claims – in the words of
Medvedev – ‘privileged interests’. Over the recent
years Russia has changed its policy of  regional
integration, away from a collective approach under
the umbrella of  the Commonwealth of  Independent
States (CIS) towards ‘coalitions of  the willing’. It
established the ECU with Belarus and Kazakhstan in
July 2010, arguably the first major post-Soviet
integration initiative with real potential. Putin,
moreover, was dreaming aloud of  a Eurasian Union.
The significance of  these initiatives is that they aim
to form an alternative for European integration. It
places some post-Soviet states into a difficult
position of  having to ‘choose’ between the EU or
Russia – a choice they usually do not want to make
as trade with both is crucial to their economies. The
issue has become most pressing in the case of  the
ECU versus the DCFTA, which in their current form
are incompatible. Therefore Armenia’s choice for the
former is a serious blow to the EaP. Furthermore,
Russia is set to pursue the course of  further regional
economic integration, with the creation of  the




In considering these challenges facing the EaP how might some of these
challenges be addressed?
• These centralised forums should be transparently
structured and better integrated into EU policy-
and decision-making process. They should also
be in position to operate their budgets; support
local initiatives without excessive bureaucracy;
run their own campaign of  information and
interest recruitment; and offer facilities for
education and regional and national levels
through the establishment of  the network of
excellence amongst the leading HEIs across the
region. Their remit should include (i) agenda-
setting; (ii) coordinating; (iii) monitoring; (iv)
sharing best practice; and (iv) networking roles.
• Their interactions with EU delegations and
Member States’ missions should acquire more
regular and structured nature, in the form of
planning, organising joint activities and
disseminating knowledge to local communities.
An Accessible visa regime should facilitate
exchange of  knowledge and best practices within
the EaP region, as well as between the EU and
local stakeholders.
Education initiatives:
• Invest in the creation of  ‘European faculty’
models’ successfully utilised in the Baltic states
during the pre-accession period, to facilitate
reform of  education system at all levels across the
leading HEIs, and especially at the tertiary level
• Facilitate HEIs integration into the EACEA and the
creation of  linkages and networks of  excellence,
utilising the Jean Monnet route, between the
national, regional and European HEIs
• Introduce new curricular and extra-curricular
activities for students and wider public; to
increase awareness and attractiveness of  the EU
as a partner
Russia: From decoupling to recoupling
differently
With the establishment of  the ENP/EaP and
Moscow’s decision to stay out, the EU has de facto
decoupled its Russia’s policy from its Eastern
Europe policy. Though competition over the
neighbourhood is partly a matter of  perception, the
EU should think creatively how to move from
decoupling to recoupling, and how to ensure
political compromise. A maximum compatibility of
the DCFTA and ECU codex should be ensured to
warrant the interest and commitment of  all sides.
The longer term objective should be to make both
integration initiatives (the EU-centred EaP and the
Russia-centred Eurasian project) maximally
compatible. This would liberate the EaP countries
from unwelcome choices between the EU and
Russia, but it would also ease tensions between EU
member states on prioritising either Russia or the
EaP neighbours:
Policy priorities beyond Vilnius: EaP 2.0
Next generation objective
The EU needs to define a ‘next generation’ objective
for the EaP as it enters the implementation phase of
the current set of  AAs. This needs to be both eye-
catching but also to set a clear strategy ambition for
policy. It is also important to highlight that bilateral
relations are not enough to ensure all level
engagement. The question of  any future
membership perspective for EaP states does not
need to be directly addressed but the direction of
EU policy must not be to exclude this as an issue of
future consideration. Our proposal is that the EU
should set European Partnership Community (EPC)
status as a bilateral and multilateral goal for the EaP.
With some EaP countries feeling pressured to
choose between Russia-centred and EU-centred
initiatives, the EU’s capacity to offer a more
ambitious form of  integration to its Eastern
neighbours presents itself  with increasing urgency
on the EU’s agenda. Not only the new ‘roadmaps’
should be better ‘channelled’ (Füle, July 2013); but
also a dialogue for legal approximation and
compatibility should be considered to service the
newly emerging economic regimes – DCFTA and
ECU/EEU.
Multilateral cooperation should be taken to a new
level, reaching out to all levels of  civil society, with
local and centralised coordination of  actions and
stakes. Incentives for cooperation and partnership
should be clearly defined; and more publicity for
policy legitimation should be ensured.
Frozen conflicts roadmap
The EU should define a clearer, and measureable,
set of  objectives for its role in the resolution of  the
‘frozen’ conflicts of  the Eastern Partnership. The
Serbia-Kosovo dialogue has demonstrated that EU
diplomacy has a capacity for tackling the most
intractable of  bilateral disputes. The same level of
focus and attention should be given to conflicts
within the Eastern neighbourhood. More clarity in
terms of  instruments and incentives is needed to
ensure extension of  the AA/DCFTA and VLAP to
these troubled zones.
Belarus rethink
Policy towards Belarus needs refreshing with the EU
giving consideration to alternatives to the current
stalemate. As indicative Belarus must be included in
the Euronest, if  a policy of  norms approximation
remains an objective. Cooperation through
CORLEAP, business forums, cross-border initiatives,
and especially the work with HEIs (and their
integration into EACEA area) should offer
constructive opportunities for developing dialogue at
the political level.
Visa liberalisation
Visa liberalisation is a very sensitive issue to many
member states and little progress has been made to
date. Yet, concessions in this area would logically go
hand in hand with closer political and economic
integration. Speeding up visa liberalisation in a
differentiated way may generate additional influence
for the EU and would enhance its legitimacy among
citizens of  the EaP countries considerably.
Civil society engagement: deepening and
broadening
The EU needs to invest even more in deep
democracy, linkage and people-to-people contacts
to avoid any conception that democracy promotion
is one-sidedly dependent on the willingness of
political elites to give in to pressure. Tackling
corruption and selective justice are crucial to avoid a
democratisation policy that remains limited to formal,
institutional aspects of  democracy, without being
deeply rooted. Civil Society is the key instrument
here. CSF is a powerful, yet underutilised instrument
of  the EU engagement in the eastern region. A more
structured approach, and better operationalization
of  its targets are needed to increase its
effectiveness:
• A centralised and functional representation of
national platforms is needed both in Brussels and
in the region, to improve lobbying opportunities,
consolidate available resources and their
outreach/availability, and to ensure continuing
exchange of  best practices between the
participating sides in the region.
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message that the EaP is not targeting Russia’s
interests in the area and may help to disclose
common rather than divisive interests.
Making the DCFTA compatible with the ECU
This long term vision is particularly important where
policies do clash. Presently, the DCFTA is
incompatible with the ECU, and the forthcoming
EEU, but it does not need to be so in the longer
term, if  for example a free trade agreement can be
concluded between Russia and the EU pursuing the
harmonisation of  policies, which would be in the
interest of  all parties, or partnership by mutual
recognition. No doubt the road to this objective will
be long and winding, for example requiring the
renegotiation of  WTO tariffs. But rather than the ECU
being simply perceived as a rivalling alternative for
the EU, it potentially offers certain opportunities for
cooperation: like the EU it is a rule-based
organisation, complying with WTO regulations and
mirroring EU institutions. Despite huge political
obstacles and economic concerns, this may
potentially form a fertile ground for developing free
trade initiatives over time in the form of  inter-regional
cooperation. Both partners should work actively in
this direction, to avoid that the dividing line which the
ENP/EaP seeks to avoid – between the EU and its
neighbours – would be replaced by a different
dividing line between EaP countries and Russia.
Extending the EaP
Where possible EaP initiatives need to be extended
to Russia. This happens to certain, but too limited a
degree today. Where possible Russia should be
involved in negotiations and consultations, possibly
through pilot projects. This may help to reduce
Russia’s perception of  exclusion and relative
isolation, and increase its interest and stake in the
EU market.
Vision beyond Putin
The most daunting challenge is to overcome the
strong perception of  competition in the
neighbourhood and of  mistrust between Moscow
and Brussels. The political obstacles are
tremendous and substantial progress may seem
unlikely, given recent developments in Russia. Yet,
the EU needs to develop a long term vision, thinking
beyond the Putin regime, and needs to invest in
trust-building. Involving Russia in areas where
policies are largely compatible or complementary
may counter a negative spiral of  perceived
competition. This is already done to a degree
through the Group of  Friends of  the Eastern
Partnership and by extending certain initiatives to
third countries. It should get much stronger priority
and focus predominantly on aspects of  people-to-
people contacts, education and regional
cooperation. A stronger inclusive policy sends the
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2.1 Enhanced Mobility 
2.1.1 Visa facilitation/readmissions agreement
2.1.2 Visa dialogue & visa liberalisation APs
2.1.3 Implementation of visa liberalisation APs
2.1.4 Implementation of existing Mobility Partnerships and
launch of new ones
2.2 Mobility in a managed environment
2.2.1 Asylum
2.2.2 Fight against migration including readmissions
2.2.3 Legal Migration & links between migration &
development
2.2.4 Fight against human trafficking
2.2.5 Integrated Border Management
2.2.6 Fight against organised crime
2.2.7 Fight against financial crime
2.2.8 Tackling illicit drugs
2.2.9 Fight against corruption
2.2.10 Law enforcement cooperation










2 Major stakeholders’ forums1 Thematic Platforms
1 Political Association & Economic Integration
1.1 Implementation of common values & principles
1.2 Conclusions of AAs
1.3 Establishment of DCFTAs
1.4 Common Security & Defence Policy
3.1 Integrated Border Management
3.2 SME
3.3 Electricity Market
3.4 PPRD – East
3.5 Environmental governance
3.1 Participation
3.1.1 Participation in EU programmes via MoU
3.1.2 Participation in the work of EU agencies (EuroPol;
EuroJust)
3.2 Energy
3.2.1 Energy Security/renewable energy 
3.2.2 Increasing levels of nuclear safety
3.3 Transport
3.3.1 Conclusion/implementation of Aviation Agreements
3.3.2 Maritime Safety
3.4 Regional development, agriculture & rural
development
3.4.1 Launch of PRD programmes
3.4.2 ENPARD
3.5 Environment/Climate change
3.6 Cooperation on macroeconomic/ financial stability
issues
3.7 Customs cooperation & trade facilitation
3.8 Employment & social cooperation
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3 Flagship Initiatives (sectoral integration)
1.1 Democracy & Good governance:
1.1.1 Electoral standards/media freedoms
1.1.2 Cooperation between ombudsmen
1.1.3 PAR
1.1.4 Regional/local authorities cooperation
1.1.5 Integrated border management (IBM)
1.1.6 Asylum/migration
1.1.7 Judiciary
1.1.8 Cooperation between law enforcement agencies
1.1.9 Fight against corruption
1.1.10 Fight against cybercrime
1.1.11 Civil protection (PPRDs)
1.1.12 CFSP/SCDP (new)
1.2 Economic Integration/Convergence
1.2.1 Trade regulatory cooperation (DCFTAs)
1.2.2 Cooperation on taxation/public finance
1.2.3 Customs cooperation
1.2.4 Labour market cooperation/social policy (new)






1.2.11 Cooperation with IFIs
1.3 Energy Security
1.3.1 Competitive energy/integration in EU market
1.3.2 Electricity, gas, oil
1.3.3 Energy efficiency/use of renewable energy
1.3.4 Regulatory framework in nuclear safety
1.3.5 Inclusive policy on energy security, transport, supply






1.4.6 Research & Innovation 
1.4.7 Audiovisual sector
1.4.8 Common knowledge/innovation space





EaPIC programme (from 2012+)
Instruments:
ENPI + Neighbourhood CS Facility +EFD + ECOSOC etc
2.1 EURONEST Parliamentary Assembly
2.2 CORLEP, Conference of Regional/local authorities
2.3 CFS, Civil Society Forum




2.6 European Endowment for Democracy
2.7 Council of Europe EaP Facility
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